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Abstract of Thesis 
Missed Moments: Kodak’s failure to define the consumer market for digital photography 
 
The focus of this thesis is to provide an expanded interpretation of the decline of the 
Eastman Kodak Company. Kodak is a company synonymous with cameras, pictures, and 
photography. The American photographic giant created a vast empire that was able to dominate 
the industry for the better part of the Twentieth Century. Yet, it missed the opportunity to 
develop its digital camera technology. This makes Kodak an interesting study in business 
decision making in the face of advancing disruptive technology.  
In a historical context, there is a lack of work that deeply inspects the fall of the Kodak 
company in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. The small amount of work available 
focuses on a narrow explanation for the decline of the company. A closer look reveals a more 
nuanced story that includes institutional restrictions coupled with a changing consumer 
electronics culture and business model.  
In this thesis, Kodak’s lack of desire to create a consumer market for digital photography 
is presented as a major misstep in the history of the company. It is not the aim of this work to 
exonerate or remove blame from the Kodak company for their actions. This thesis, drawing from 
primary documents found in the Eastman Kodak archives housed at The University of Rochester, 
aims to bring new ideas and explanations to the conversation. The argument presented should 
serve as an expansion of currently available interpretations which place singular blame on 
Kodak’s reliance on film profits for their downfall.  
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Chapter 1: Eastman Kodak’s Decline and Connections to Consumers, Advertising, and 
New Technologies 
1 
 
1 Eastman Museum. "#EastmanTBT: 'The world is moving, and a company that contents itself 
with present accomplishments soon falls behind' - George Eastman George Eastman in his third 
floor laboratory, May 10, 1927. Gift of the University of Rochester." Twitter, 30 Aug. 2018, 6:00 
a.m., twitter.com/eastmanmuseum/status/1035150329187323905.  
This tweeted quote, and attached image, demonstrates a juxtaposition of Eastman’s own thoughts 
with modern photography and how photographs are used in a post-film age. 
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 There is an established narrative surrounding the decline of the Eastman Kodak company 
in the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries. That narrative includes several widely 
accepted explanations for the company’s fall from its position as one of the most respected and 
dominant companies in the world. When examined more closely though, this narrative lacks 
depth and a more nuanced understanding. 
 One of the most widely circulated reasons for Kodak’s decline is simply that upper 
management in the company had become complacent. By choosing to rely on film photography’s 
large profit margins, management did not display the foresight needed to navigate the coming 
digital photography revolution. This idea is made all the more compelling by the fact that the 
Eastman Kodak company invented, and held the first patents for, digital imaging devices. 
 More in-depth interpretations of Kodak’s decline can be made if we look at ideas 
surrounding consumer history, advertising history, and how new technologies affect markets and 
businesses. The following brief summary of consumer history is meant to articulate and place its 
importance in American business and society, and provide a basis of discussion regarding 
Kodak’s success in integrating its business with that evolving consumerism. 
 
Consumer History 
The study of consumption history in America - “how Americans have acquired and used 
goods not strictly necessary to biological existence” – has emerged as a field of history, gaining 
attention in the past three decades.  With its legitimacy as a field in question for most of that 
time, many historians have only recently begun to accept consumption history as its own area of 
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study.  Such an integral part of our culture, and therefore an integral part of our cultural history, 
should not be left unstudied. 
     Fortunately, there have been a handful of historians who have focused on consumption.  
These historians have been able to write about their subject through studies in social sciences and 
the histories of economics, labor, advertising, and business.  Some even began their research 
with nothing but commonly preconceived notions of the topic they are studying.  Because of 
(this) consumption history’s development out of other, more established histories, some 
historians argue that consumption history should not be treated as an actual field of study as  “a 
prism through which many aspects of social and political life may be viewed."2  Other historians 
disagree, stating “consumers can stand as central characters across the span of the nation's past.”3 
     Many questions still exist in the field of consumer history.  Most of the writings 
available now, while covering many different aspects of consumer history, focus specifically on 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  This is the most commonly accepted timeframe 
for the beginning of modern American consumerism, making it a logical place for historians to 
start filling in this history.  What this means though, is that there is a lack of historical writing 
concerning consumption during periods before and after this timeframe.  There are also many 
topics of consumption that are in need of more study.  Issues from comparing the development of 
consumption in the U.S. with other nations to consumer awareness and autonomy are themes 
commonly raised when talking about the need for more investigation into consumption history. 
 
2 Susan Strasser, et al. Getting and Spending: European and American Consumer 
Societies in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1998.  
3 David Steigerwald. "All Hail the Republic of Choice: Consumer History as 
Contemporary Thought." Journal of American History, vol. 93, no. 2, Sept. 
2006, pp. 385-403.  
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     Given the relative newness of this field of history, and the fields growing popularity, 
one would think that the less developed issues in the field would be dealt with in time.  The past 
decade has seen increased expansion in the scope of the works being produced in the field of 
consumption history.  There has also been a wealth of research done since the late 1970s and 
early 1980s concerning advertising, moral attitudes towards spending, and the interpretation of 
historians who have commented on consumption before the expanded interest in the topic of the 
past few decades. 
     The Culture of Consumption: Critical Essays in American History, 1880-1980, edited 
by Jackson Lears and Richard Fox, is often pointed to as one of the first books to focus on the 
history of American consumption.4  This collection of essays presents ideas on subjects such as 
advertising and interpretation of past historians with respect to consumption. 
     In this work, Lears, a now noted cultural historian, discusses advertising’s role in the 
making of a mass consumer society.  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the public 
was becoming more and more uneasy about the concepts of mass society and their roles as 
consumers.  In an attempt to ease consumer anxiety, advertisers, according to Lears, began 
presenting products as vehicles for self-realization.  Lears refers to this as “the therapeutic 
ethos.” 
     Thomas Frank expands on this idea, both in terms of time and cultural influence.  Frank 
focuses on the changes in the advertising industry through the middle of the twentieth century 
and what these changes meant in terms of counter culture and consumption’s influence on each 
 
4 Richard Wightman Fox, and T. J. Jackson Lears. The Culture of Consumption: Critical Essays 
in American History, 1880-1980. New York, Random House, 1983. 
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other.5  What Frank calls “Hip Consumerism”, the idea that consumers can identify themselves 
as part of a counterculture through the consumption of mass-produced goods, was the result of 
advertisers injecting social criticism and counter cultural creativity into their ads.  In this way 
“Hip Consumerism” builds on the ideas of self-realization brought to light by Jackson Lears. 
Frank suggests that the counterculture advertisements of the 1960s and 1970s were not merely 
simple co-optation but the effects of a creative revolution in advertising happening alongside the 
cultural revolution of the time.  This raises some very interesting questions about the 
relationships between advertising, consumption, and countercultures.  If counter cultures in 
advertising targeted parallel counter cultures in society this would imply that members of 
society’s countercultures are targeted as consumers.  Is this molding?  Does this make counter 
culture members “good” consumers?  
Thomas Frank’s idea that advertising did not simply co-opt counter culture to sell 
products, but underwent its own revolution alongside the social revolution of the 1960’s 
combined with the self-realization of consumption, begins to shed light on the degree of 
autonomy held by consumers, an important piece of consumption history that needs to be 
explored in a more in depth manner.  
     Existing attempts to examine consumer autonomy and historical reasons for 
consumption seem to focus on the production and advertisement aspects of the issue.  This 
approach tends to suggest very little consumer autonomy, implying that the roles of production 
and advertising are more important than the role of the consumer in consumption.  A common 
 
5 Thomas C Frank. The Conquest of Cool: Business Culture, Counterculture, and the Rise of Hip 
Consumerism. 5th ed., Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1997. 
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criticism of this approach is that “What is largely missing from these discussions is the 
consumer.” 
     Richard Fox’s essay, in The Culture of Consumption, on Robert Lynd, the often referred 
to early observer of consumer culture, focuses on Lynd’s upbringing and religious work before 
his historical and social sciences work.6 This essay raises some questions about the connection 
between religion, morality, and consumption.  Fox suggests that religion plays a role in the 
organization of a mass society.  This may be a factor in the prevalence of moral criticism in late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century American consumer society. 
         The issue of morality in regards to consumption is dealt with by historian Daniel 
Horowitz, in his book The Morality of Spending: Attitudes Towards the Consumer Society in 
America, 1875-1940.  Horowitz gives valuable insight into the prevailing moral stances of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Core Protestant values of thrift, delayed 
gratification, and hard work are at the center of these stances.  This would indicate an agreement 
among some historians as to the existence of a point of view, held by early consumer society 
observers, that was based on the contrast of right and wrong.7  
Some of the attitudes surrounding spending and how certain people should, or should not, 
spend their money began to shift during the period Horowitz’s was writing about. Moving 
through the 20th century, morals concerning consumption began to morph.  Later moralism 
 
6 Richard Wightman Fox. The Culture of Consumption: Critical Essays in American History, 
1880-1980. New York, Random House, 1983. 
7 Horowitz, Daniel. The Morality of Spending: Attitudes toward the Consumer Society in 
America, 1875-1940. Chicago, I.R. Dee, 1985. 
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focused more on an increasingly materialistic middle class, mass culture, and an economic 
system that was seen as becoming predatory upon the consumer.  With inflation in the pre-World 
War I era came a realization by the middle class that they too may have to sacrifice in some areas 
of spending to maintain in another areas.  The moral scrutiny began to focus on them. 
 While there is a bit of consensus about the right and wrong moral observations of early 
consumption critics, the influence of these critiques is debatable.  Whether or not, and what 
portion of, actual consumers followed the moral guidelines set for them is called into question in 
Lendol Calder’s Financing the American Dream: A Cultural History of Consumer Credit.8 
Calder argues that because of the rise of wage labor and the regular pay period, people began to 
borrow money, for consumptive purposes, in anticipation of their next paycheck.  Calder 
describes early forms of borrowing by working and middle-class consumers and also includes 
moral objections to these forms of consumer credit.  One of Calder’s conclusions is that there has 
become a “myth of lost economic virtue”, that although moral critiques of consumption were 
abundant, they were not always followed.  
     Calder also includes an interesting insight as to why the practices of consumer credit 
became acceptable.  Calder argues that borrowing, and its resulting debt, caused consumers to 
follow strict budgets and encourage saving in order to pay these debts.  The idea that consumer 
credit and debt provide reasons for hard work, thrift, and budgeting are attributed to the moral 
acceptance of consumer credit.  
 
8 Lendol Calder. Financing the American Dream: A Cultural History of Consumer Credit. 
Princeton, Princeton UP, 2001. 
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     The fact that practices once considered immoral were moralized and accepted shows 
consumer societies history of right and wrong thinking, and its need to present ideas in 
opposition to another.  This can become a problematic way of thinking though.  According to 
Susan Strasser “we have to drop the practice of framing our work with the binary opposites.”9  
While Strasser does acknowledge the fact that binary thinking can answer broader questions 
about consumption history, she argues that “the realm of consumptions is a domain where dyads 
merge”, and that by “accepting and even embracing the contradictions, scholars have begun to 
revamp our conceptual apparatus.”10 In other words, binary opposites, such as right and wrong, 
production and consumption, and work and leisure often become one and the same in 
consumption history, and by understanding this we can be better prepared to evaluate 
consumption history. 
     An example of merging opposites can be seen in Lawrence Glickman’s A Living Wage: 
American Workers and the Making of a Consumer Society.11  In this work Glickman offers 
insight into the emergence of wage labor and its role in creating an American consumer society. 
  Glickman’s main argument is that American laborers underwent a shift from producers to 
consumers. Instead of laborers seeing themselves as the producers of goods, entitled to the full 
benefits of those goods, Glickman argues that they began to accept that wage labor, if high 
 
9 Susan Strasser. "Making Consumption Conspicuous: Transgressive Topics Go Mainstream." 
Technology & Culture, vol. 43, no. 4, Oct. 2002, pp. 755-70. 
10 Ibid. 
11Lawrence B Glickman. A Living Wage: American Workers and the Making of Consumer 
Society. Ithaca, Cornell UP, 1997. 
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enough, could allow a person to provide for themselves and their family by consuming goods in 
order to fulfill needs and wants. 
     Glickman illustrates some very important points in A Living Wage.  First, production 
and consumption areas are not always clearly defined and separated.  Laborers were still 
producing goods for consumption through their work as wage laborers.  In this way laborers 
were, at the same time, producers and consumers, responsible for both sides of the dichotomy.  
Calder, in Financing the American Dream, also illustrates the merging of dyads, this time 
concerning the work/leisure dichotomy when he argues that, with the introduction of 
consumption credit came an increase in debt for consumer purchases.  Because of this debt, the 
leisure of shopping required a stricter work ethic in order to repay the debts.   Here we can see 
examples of the complications that can arise from thinking in binary opposites, no matter how 
tempting it may be to do so. 
     Glickman also provides background for some of the ideas presented in Calder’s 
Financing the American Dream when he writes about the emerging wage labor system. Calder’s 
argument that consumer credit’s rise in popularity came along with the rise in wage labor is 
supported by Glickman’s writing on the living wage. If laborer’s increasing demand for higher 
wages, wages that might have supported a certain standard of living, were not met this would 
lead laborers to seek some form of borrowing in order to attain that desired standard of living. 
     What Glickman does not touch on is why laborers/consumers, or consumers in general, 
came to accept their new roles.  Based on Glickman’s shift in attitudes and Lears’ observation 
about the growing uneasiness of mass society and consumer roles, questioning why, or what, 
caused the acceptance of modern consumer society seems like a logical question. 
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     Then again consumption history is a growing field, and there are many questions that 
remain to be answered about it.   These are just a few of those questions, and a small portion of 
the answers already offered.   We can only assume that in time there will be more and more 
research done, books written, and answers given.  These answers will undoubtedly produce more 
questions, as is the case with many areas of history. 
     All of this offers plenty of areas for historians to explore in the history of consumption, 
and these areas should be explored.  Such an important and frequently performed, but often 
overlooked, action in our culture deserves serious attention.  After all, as David Steigerwald has 
argued, “Consumption . . . may be the defining thread of American life.”12 
 
Advertising History 
In addition to the valuable ideas that have been put forth on the subject of consumer 
history, advertising history can also provide important understandings needed for a more in-
depth analysis of the Eastman Kodak company. What follows is the consideration of six books 
that have become important texts in the history of advertising. By weaving together various ideas 
and themes in advertising, these books, taken together, are able to provide a solid base in the 
study and understanding of the subject. By comparing and contrasting the ideas presented in the 
following books one can begin to navigate the conversation of advertising history. 
Advertising history not only contributes to our understanding of consumer history, but it 
also plays an important role in understanding Kodak’s interactions with consumer culture. 
 
12 David Steigerwald. "All Hail the Republic of Choice: Consumer History as Contemporary 
Thought." Journal of American History, vol. 93, no. 2, Sept. 2006, pp. 385-403. 
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Kodak’s ability to create a consumer market for snapshot photography, which is discussed later 
in this thesis, can be seen in marketing campaigns and slogans that have become iconic pieces of 
advertising.  
Advertising is a many faceted and complex operation. In assessing advertising’s 
influence in shaping our American experience, a history of advertising can focus on a range of 
topics. While some authors may focus on the economics of advertising, others may emphasize 
advertising’s cultural impact, the message of a certain type of advertisement, or the media used 
to convey these messages. In addition, the players effecting, or being affected by, advertising 
range from businesses who advertise, advertising agencies, and media executives to the general 
consuming public. In order to gain a proper understanding of advertising’s history all of these 
factors must be discussed. 
Daniel Pope’s The Making of Modern Advertising is, chronologically, the first of the six 
books.13 Published in 1983, Pope’s book marks the beginning of serious study on the subject and 
focuses on the development of advertising up to 1920. Until Pope’s book most histories were 
focused on the artistic aspects of advertising or produced by in house historians of the 
advertising agencies themselves. 
         One major contribution of this book is an outlining of the development of the American 
advertising industry. This outline, which has been accepted and repeated by the other historians 
who will be discussed, begins with the patent medicine salesman of the mid-nineteenth century. 
These salesmen traveled about and stirred the imaginations and emotions of consumers in order 
to sell their products. As industrial manufacturing increased in the late nineteenth century and 
 
13 Daniel Pope. The Making of Modern Advertising. NY: Basic Books, 1983.  
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large producers began to advertise their goods it would not be long before business owners 
sought out individuals who could place the advertisements they produced. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, early advertising professionals are often referred to as “space brokers”, 
middle men who could go between businesses and media outlets in an attempt to maximize an 
advertisement’s exposure. During the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decades 
of the twentieth century advertising agencies and executives struggled to define their industry. 
Through the use of trade publications, agencies and executives were able to legitimize and 
standardize their emerging industry by the 1920’s. 
         Pope proposes a heavily economic interpretation of why this development happened. 
Mass production of goods by big business necessitated the expansion of markets in which goods 
could be sold. In order to make money by selling goods with low profit margins businesses had 
to sell large quantities of their products to large amounts of consumers. Improvements in 
communication and transportation during the late nineteenth century allowed goods to reach a 
wider range of markets. Therefore, advertising became increasingly important in stirring sales to 
these expanded markets. Pope also suggests that advertising agencies were successful in 
persuading businesses to compete through their advertisements instead of price competition, the 
latter of which could be extremely harmful to profits. 
Pope does not use economics exclusively though. In assessing aspects of advertising 
other than business interests, Pope examines advertising agencie’s influence on the ethics of 
advertising as well as the types of messages conveyed. By examining multiple aspects of the 
development of American advertising, Pope provides a strong starting point for studying the 
subject. 
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Pamela Walker Laird’s Advertising Progress: American Business and the Rise of 
Consumer Marketing focuses on the same time period of the late nineteenth century until 1920.14 
Laird’s contribution comes in the form of a more detailed analysis of the development of the 
advertising industry while also framing advertising as progress on several levels. Progress in 
production, the advertising industry, and consumption are all discussed. 
         In examining the progress in production that was pushed by advertisers, Laird relates 
stories of business owners using advertisements to announce improved quality and production 
capabilities, along with availability and prices, to previously unreachable markets. Laird’s 
analysis, that advertising addressed businesses’ immediate needs to sell products, is in line with 
Pope’s economic analysis. 
         Laird also expands on Pope’s discussion of the advertising industry’s attempts to 
legitimize and stabilize itself. In examining a wide range of trade publications Laird put forth the 
idea that the advertising industry presented itself as a step in the progression of American 
business. Framing the emerging industry in the business trends of specialization and efficiency, 
the advertising industry was able to gain acceptance. 
         Progress in consumption came by advertising the buying of goods as a way to improve 
the buyer’s life. The availability of goods could be seen as having a direct effect on improving 
the quality of life for the consumer. Other historians have their own way of addressing 
availability, emerging big business, and emotional, consumer focused advertising. 
 
14 Pamela Walker Laird, and John Staudenmaier. "Advertising History." Technology and 
Culture, vol. 30, no. 4, Oct. 1989, pp. 1031-36. 
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Fables of Abundance: A Cultural History of Advertising in America is Jackson Lears’ 
analysis of how advertising and the increased availability of goods have affected American 
consumer culture.15 According to Lears, the abundance of products made possible by the 
industrial revolution, and the subsequent advertising of these products, caused the efficient 
factory to replace the fecund earth as a source of abundant production. Because of this shift 
consumers became less attached to the products they consumed. Availability and uniformity of 
goods led to a decline in animism of products. 
         Lears attributes some of this shift to similar ideas presented by Pope and Laird, such as 
the need for stable economic conditions and the American affinity for efficiency. Emotional 
connection to products is the focus of Lears’ book though. Touting the carnivalesque 
characteristics of early advertising methods, Lears argues that a great deal of emotional 
connection to a product is lost when businesses began modern advertising in the late nineteenth 
century. This emotional detachment between consumers and the goods they consume, along with 
Lears’ therapeutic ethos, provides a narrative of shifting emotional connection from the products 
themselves to the idea that a product can improve one’s life. 
         Lears provides a history that is focused on how advertising affects consumers and 
American culture. His aim is not so much to shed light on the businesses that used advertising 
and why they advertised. Lears spends little time on how the message of advertising is delivered 
 
15 Jackson Lears.  Fables of Abundance: A Cultural History of Advertising in America. NY: 
Basic Books, 1994.  
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through various media channels. What Lears does focus on is the message of advertising and 
how it affected the consuming public’s view of their world. 
         In contrast, Roland Marchand’s Creating the Corporate Soul: The Rise of Public 
Relations and Corporate Imagery in American Big Business does a fine job of weaving 
emotional public opinion concerning big businesses with how and why those businesses tried to 
change public opinion.16 In doing so Marchand evaluates several forms of media used to deliver 
messages along with the role that advertising agencies played in shaping institutional advertising. 
The focus of Marchand’s book is how institutional advertising was used by big businesses to 
generate good will and combat perceptions of large soulless corporations. By analyzing the rise 
of public relations, Marchand demonstrated that big businesses were able to change the way the 
consuming public viewed such institutions. Marchand lays out a shift from skeptical criticism 
during the Progressive era to acceptance of big business by the 1950’s. 
         Marchand strengthens his argument through the use of public opinion polling and 
customer feedback. Marchand uses this information in much the same way that Pope uses 
economic figures to prove the effectiveness and growth of advertising. Advertising that attempts 
to sway the public opinion of a large corporation in this manner can be seen as directly 
addressing and overcoming the issues of cold, mechanical mass production and the 
preoccupation with efficiency that both Lears and Laird present. 
 
16 Roland Marchand. Creating the Corporate Soul: The Rise of Public Relations and Corporate 
Imagery in American Big Business. University of California Press, Berkley and Los Angeles, 
California: 1998. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
         Marchand also touches on the attempts of big businesses to sway public opinion in 
relation to political issues. Beginning with Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency, Marchand initiates a 
discussion based on using media and advertising to persuade voters. Advertising executives, such 
as Bruce Barton, persuaded corporations to sway public opinion away from government 
involvement in business to free enterprise. 
         In Better Living: Advertising, Media, and the New Vocabulary of Business Leadership, 
1935-1955 William L. Bird Jr. offers an expanded view of the conflict between government and 
industry that played out in the advertising media since Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency.17 
Although Bird begins his book discussing the success of government public relations campaigns, 
his focus quickly turns to efforts made in combating these campaigns. Some reading on how 
government uses the media and advertising to influence voters may be a good compliment to this 
book. By assessing the role of industrial associations, advertising executives and media 
executives, Bird provides a rich explanation of how advertising media turned from educational 
dictation to entertainment in order to sway the public. Much like Marchand, Bird used opinion 
polling to demonstrate the effectiveness of entertaining styles of advertisement. This information 
was essential in order for advertising businesses to accept this new style, and also continued to 
validate advertising agencies and executives. 
Some interesting questions can be asked, and comparisons can be made, when looking at 
the Bird and Lears books. Does Bird’s entertaining style of advertising conflict with Lears 
 
17 William L. Bird Jr. Better Living: Advertising, Media, and the New Vocabulary of Business 
Leadership, 1935-1955. Northwestern University Press, 1999.  
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decline in carnivalesque advertising? Most likely these two historians would be in agreement 
when focusing on the educational dictation used to combat Franklin Roosevelt’s election 
campaign of 1936. In addition, Lears presents accounts of consumer habits that suggest a desire 
for his carnivalesque advertising and therapeutic ethos. It is possible that this desire was met with 
an advertising style that entertained consumers while projecting the idea that consumer goods, 
and the companies that produced them, could provide the consuming public with a better life. 
According to Bird, however, this does not mean that advertisers produced entertaining ads for the 
sole purpose of fulfilling consumer desires. If those desires were met it is most likely because 
when those desires are fulfilled it generates larger audiences of potential consumers. In Better 
Living Bird lays out an advertising culture that eventually would end up paying for actors and 
programs that would attract the largest audiences possible. 
         David E. Nye’s Image Worlds: Corporate Identities at General Electric is a case study 
of one corporation’s efforts to address a number of audiences.18 By focusing on the photography 
of in house General Electric publications, Nye reveals how one big business portrayed itself in a 
number of ways. Nye shows that there are wide ranges of individuals who can be seen as 
consumers by examining advertisements geared towards labor, engineers, management, 
executives, and the consuming public. 
         Much like Roland Marchand, Nye shows that a corporation can use advertising and 
imagery to persuade opinion. Nye puts forth a more nuanced interpretation though. General 
 
18 David E Nye.  Image Worlds: Corporate Identities at General Electric, 1890-1930.  MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass.  1985. 
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Electric did not attempt to persuade only the consuming public, but also every level of employee 
in the company. Each group was given its own messages which were carefully constructed to 
combat possible negative feelings towards the company. In addition, each group was provided 
with messages that would cultivate positive opinions of General Electric in that group. 
         Nye’s analysis of the artistic aspect of photography is presented as well. Here, Nye 
seems to be in opposition to Lears when he argues that corporate and advertising photography is 
very different from artistic photography. In Fables of Abundance Lears argues for the artistic 
merits in some aspects of advertising such as technical ability in producing imagery. Lears is also 
very fond of pop art, which often uses consumer goods and images to create art that, according to 
him, gives new energy to the animism of goods. Nye argues that advertising photography, while 
technical and well put together, is created for very different purposes, mainly to persuade 
consumers. 
         Nye offers a top-down history in Image Worlds. Unlike Marchand’s text on 
institutional advertising, Nye spends a small amount of time addressing the consuming public in 
his book. In addition, Nye does not include information that would indicate the effectiveness of 
General Electric’s strategies. Pope, Marchand, and Bird all surpass Nye in qualifying their 
proposals with data. 
         It is surprising that a subject that has such a significant cultural impact did not receive 
serious attention until the early 1980’s. Some articles from this time lament the delay in the 
development of advertising history. Others praise the advent of studying advertising history, and 
propose questions that advertising history should address. Fortunately, there is now a collection 
of work on the subject. 
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         In all, these six books represent a solid foundation on which to begin studying 
advertising in American history. When taken together they represent a rich tapestry of 
corporations, government, advertising agencies, media executives, and a wide range of 
consumers of advertising. In addition, the many reasons for why advertising has developed the 
way it has and how it has developed have been explored along with the effectiveness of the 
messages and methods used. All of these factors combined tell the story of advertising’s effect 
on American consumption habits and cultural history. 
 
Connecting Kodak to Consumer and Advertising History 
         As an American company, the Eastman Kodak Company became a beneficiary of the 
histories of consumption and advertising. Its place among the most respected, even envied, 
companies on the planet is a direct result of many of the ideas just discussed. Kodak’s 
relationship with consumer history and advertising history is not only as a beneficiary of these 
histories though. Kodak also played an important role in shaping these histories. 
         Another important work in the histories of consumption and advertising is Nancy Martha 
West’s Kodak and the Lens of Nostalgia. In her book, West lays out some of the early 
advertising strategies that were employed by George Eastman, founder of the Eastman Kodak 
Company.19 West argues that Kodak’s advertising strategies of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries set the company on a trajectory that would allow them to dominate the 
photography world. The path Eastman took to legitimize simple snapshot photography, and the 
 
19 Nancy Martha West. Kodak and the Lens of Nostalgia. Charlottesville, UP of Virginia, 2000. 
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products his company sold in order to produce the snapshots, relied heavily on marketing and 
advertising. 
This advertising is credited with having the effect of taking photography from an 
expensive, time consuming activity, to something that almost anyone could participate in. Kodak 
essentially created a market for what was seen as inferior equipment and processes at the time. 
This not only serves to prove the effectiveness of advertising strategies in changing the opinions 
and habits of consumers, but also provides a foundation to study how entire consumer markets 
can be created. In this way we can use West’s history and apply it to more recent historical 
events in an attempt to create a deeper understanding of these events. 
 
New Technologies and Disrupted Markets 
The idea of new technologies and their impact on markets is an important piece of a more 
nuanced understanding of the Eastman Kodak company in the late twentieth and early twenty 
first centuries. By gaining an understanding of the history of how new technologies can disrupt 
markets and affect businesses, it is possible to form new understandings that challenge the 
accepted narratives surrounding Kodak’s decline. Because it is important to approach a subject 
from multiple angles to gain a more complete understanding of that subject, we will explore a set 
of ideas that are not explored deeply enough in relation to Kodak. 
What happens when new technologies come to market? How does this affect the 
companies involved in a particular market? Why do companies have difficulty coping with new 
technologies? These questions and others that relate to them are an interesting area of study and 
have an established literature surrounding them. What follows is a summary of the work of two 
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important people who have worked to interpret the effects of new technologies on businesses and 
markets.  
 Clayton M. Christensen’s incredibly important book, The Innovator's Dilemma, outlines 
how companies can and do mismanage new technologies.20 Throughout history we can find 
large, successful companies that go out of business because of this mismanagement. Christensen 
provides insight into how this happens and why. 
 By dividing new technologies into two categories, sustaining technologies and disruptive 
technologies, Christensen begins to form an understanding of how this all works. Sustaining 
technologies are technologies that enhance current technologies. Sustaining technologies are 
easy to promote and integrate. They often require very little rethinking or reworking of 
technologies, but offer benefits such as increased capacities, smaller sizes, and dropping price 
points. In contrast, disruptive technologies often start out expensive and underwhelming. 
Usually, disruptive technologies will underperform compared to established technologies in 
similar established markets. Disruptive technologies also, initially, only appeal to niche markets. 
These early markets are seen as unprofitable and a difficult place to find growth for the 
company. For these reasons, Christensen argues, managers will promote sustaining technologies 
and kill disruptive technologies. 
 Christensen argues that this is often where companies undo themselves. Over time an 
established technology and its sustaining technologies begin to provide more than consumers 
need, want, or can afford. At the same time, sustaining technology is added to the initial 
 
20 Clayton M Christensen. The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great 
Firms to Fail. Harvard Business Review Press, 2015. 
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disruptive technology, improving capacity, size, and price, until disruptive technology has an 
opportunity to take hold of that market. This is the pattern that Christensen sets out as the cycle 
of technology markets. 
 While Christensen’s study of computer hard-drives offers a wonderful case-study for his 
ideas, digital photography easily fits into the category of disruptive technology. In fact, later 
versions of the book identify digital photography as a disruptive technology that fits 
Christensen’s mold. This is part of the reason that this work is an important piece of this thesis. It 
is an interesting exercise to apply Christensen’s advice for how to handle disruptive technologies 
to the Eastman Kodak Company. When done, several things become clearer about how Kodak 
viewed itself, it’s abilities, and its markets. 
 Also adding to this discussion is Christian Sandstrom, a professor at Chalmers University 
of Technology, the Ratio Institute, and Jönköping International Business School, Sweden. 
Sandstrom’s work deals with innovation, technology, and business. What makes Sandstrom’s 
work interesting and valuable to this topic, is his personal interest in the photography industry. 
He has written about Swedish photography company Hasselblad and about the Eastman Kodak 
Company. 
 Expanding on Clayton Christensen’s ideas of disruptive technology, Sandstrom adds that 
the business model of a company ties them to certain ways of doing business. When a disruptive 
technology is introduced, a company’s old way of doing business may make it impossible for 
that company to compete in the new market. As an example, Sandstrom uses the shift to digital 
photography to point out that Kodak had every advantage in markets based on chemicals and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
 
photo papers, but that chemical engineers were not nearly as useful for producing high quality 
digital imaging parts. 
 This idea of a company’s identity being set by its abilities and personnel is something 
that can be expanded upon when combined with a study of a company’s use of advertising. How 
a company views itself has a large impact on the markets it involves itself in. Because of this, we 
can look at advertising and marketing pushes to gain a better understanding of how a company 
sees itself. 
 
Kodak and Digital Photography 
Why should we take a deeper look at Eastman Kodak’s missteps in handling digital 
photography? Why should we question the existing literature and commonly held beliefs about 
the company’s fall from grace? These questions need to be explored in order to create a fuller, 
richer picture of this story. This development, Kodak’s downfall, did not rest on a single issue. It 
did not happen because of a single event, single idea, or lack of will in a single area. Instead, the 
decline of the Eastman Kodak company was caused by a number of decisions and institutional 
views that led to a chain of events. The story of Kodak’s failure to capitalize on its digital 
photography patent can be viewed through a number of lenses. 
While there is a relatively small amount of literature on this subject, almost all of it 
revolves around a single concept. The idea that Kodak executives grew complacent, content with 
large profit margins on photographic film products, and their dominance of the film market, are 
the standard reasons given. The idea that dominates popular opinion is that no matter what the 
leaders of the company were told, no matter what was being forecast by those in advisory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
 
positions, the particular set of people in charge during the 1970s, 80s, and 90s saw no reason to 
deviate from the standard operating procedure. While large profit margins would have been a 
factor, along with a secure position in the upper echelon of Fortune 500 companies, this would 
not have made Kodak’s position impenetrable. Given the fact that Japanese film companies 
began to take more of the market share for film at this time, any reasonably competent executive 
would have been able to see at least a small storm on the horizon. To assume that a company as 
large and dominant as Kodak, for as long as Kodak was large and dominant, could go twenty-
plus years without minimally competent leadership seems highly unlikely. This makes the 
investigation of other possible causes a significant pursuit.  
In addition, the Eastman Kodak company’s cultural impact is hard to overstate. Kodak is 
a company that is synonymous with photography and imaging. Almost all Americans, and many 
other people around the world, who were alive during the twentieth century are sure to have 
experienced their own “Kodak Moment.” George Eastman, founder and namesake of the 
Eastman Kodak Company is a pivotal figure in bringing snapshot photography, photography for 
non-professionals, to the masses. His history of invention and innovation in the field of 
photography was directly responsible for a wide range of products such as roll film, affordable 
cameras, and streamlined processing systems. These innovations helped to bring photography to 
the masses in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His cultural impact is still thriving 
today, even if the company that bears his name is not. One needs only to visit a popular tourist 
attraction to see legions of selfie-snapping consumers to understand the continued importance 
that snapshot photography plays in our lives today. Because of the cultural significance of such a 
company, a study of that company’s missteps should be valuable. 
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The rest of this offering will argue the following thesis and some of the logical 
consequences that stem from it.  
 
One of the major reasons for Eastman Kodak’s failure to capitalize on digital 
photography is because they failed to set the market for their new, disruptive, technology, as they 
once did with snapshot photography. For the purposes of this thesis, to “set the market” will 
mean that a company is more effective than other companies in communicating to consumers 
what a new technology or product might mean to them. This would place a company in a 
position to dictate to consumers how a technology or product is used, what it is used for, and 
who might use it.  
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Chapter 2: Kodak’s History of Making Consumer Markets 
The Eastman Kodak Company has a history of innovation in the field of photography. 
The digital imaging device that Kodak created in 1975 was by no means the first time they 
produced a product that would shift the photography field in fundamental ways. Kodak products 
changed the who, what, where, why, when, and how of late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century photography. By introducing roll film and affordable, easy to use photography 
equipment to the general public, George Eastman and the Eastman Kodak Company simplified a 
highly scientific process. Producing photographic images became something that almost anyone 
could do. 
In 1849, Henry Hunt Snelling published The History and Practice of the Art of 
Photography: or the Production of Pictures Through the Agency of Light. This early work was 
an explanation of the mechanics and processes used in producing photographs, and was, 
according to Snelling, intended to “fill a void, much complained of by Daguerreotypists — 
particularly young beginners.”21 Snelling then proceeded to explain that “all the English works 
on the subject — particularly on the practical application of photogenic drawing — are deficient 
in many minute details which are essential to a complete understanding of the art.”22 Snelling’s 
intention seemed to be aimed at producing a text that would make photography more accessible 
to a particular group of people. 
At the same time The History and Practice of the Art of Photography serves as a perfect 
window into the complicated nature of early photography. The level of understanding and 
 
21 Henry Hunt Snelling. History and Practice of the Art of Photography. Kindle ed., (New York, 
G.P. Putnam, 1849.), 3 
22 Ibid, 3 
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instruction needed to produce a photograph in the mid-nineteenth century, and the barriers this 
caused, are summed up well when Snelling wrote that he wanted to produce a complete system 
of photography that could 
enable any gentleman, or lady, who may wish to participate in the art, for profit or 
amusement, to do so without the trouble and expense of seeking instruction from 
professors, which in many cases within my knowledge has prevented people from 
embracing the profession23 
 
What followed was an offering that was very much a textbook for aspiring professionals. 
Overflowing with technical descriptions of chemical solutions and proper processes, the book 
reads like an upper level college book, with a healthy dose of mechanical engineering added in. 
Photography of the time was clearly not something that was done without thought. Photography 
was not a hobby. It was a profession and an art that required knowledge, training, and 
experience. 
This was a very different kind of photography, and a different idea of photography, than 
our modern photography. Throughout the twentieth century picture taking had become 
something that was accessible to so many. It became something done almost reflexively, during 
vacations, parties, holidays, and in so many more situations. These shifts were the result of the 
efforts of the Eastman Kodak company in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
A few new forms of technology and a change of ideas were needed to permanently 
change photography from a profession, and an art form, into a hobby or even a reaction. These 
new technologies did not immediately take hold, and the new ideas that Kodak spread required 
considerable time and effort to take to gain a foothold. Through focused advertising campaigns 
 
23 Ibid, 3 
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and a willingness to embrace inferior, but more convenient, technology, Kodak eventually 
molded the photography industry into a market they would dominate for the majority of the 
twentieth century. 
One of the new technologies that Kodak embraced was roll film. While Kodak did not 
invent roll film, or even initially think that it would be a viable technology, the company did 
eventually use it as a way to bring photography to the masses.24 As Kamal A. Munir and Nelson 
Philips described: 
The major advancement of Kodak’s roll-film camera was the replacement of the 
fragile glass plates by a chemically coated film that allowed permanent images to 
form. This relieved the photographer from handling glass plates, and made 
cameras much more compact. However, the images produced by these cameras 
were of extremely poor quality compared with those produced on dry glass plates, 
and were openly derided by the professionals and serious amateurs who then 
dominated the practice of photography25 
 
Roll film provided conveniences for consumers, but it came with a price. By 
eliminating the need for large glass or metallic plates covered with chemicals, roll film 
greatly simplified the mechanics and chemistry of the camera. Once Kodak was able to 
implement a process by which they would be responsible for developing rolls of film 
containing the consumer’s pictures, much of Snelling's instruction on chemical 
compositions and the mechanics of handling large equipment was no longer a concern for 
the person who was taking the picture. This idea is superbly conveyed in 1888 by George 
Eastman’s famous “You press the button. We do the rest” slogan. 
 
24 Kamal Munir, and Nelson Philips. “The Birth of the ‘Kodak Moment’: Institutional 
Entrepreneurship and the Adoption of New Technologies.” Organization Studies, PDF ed., vol. 
26, no. 11, 1 November 2005, pp. 1665-87. 
25 Ibid 
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The No. 1 camera, introduced in 1888 was Kodak’s first offering in a line of cameras that 
would bring about the convenience and popularization of snapshot photography. According to 
the Kodak company: 
With the KODAK Camera in 1888, Eastman put down the foundation for making 
photography available to everyone. Pre-loaded with enough film for 100 
exposures, the camera could be easily carried and handheld during operation. It 
was priced at $25. After exposure, the whole camera was returned to Rochester. 
There the film was developed, prints were made and new film was inserted -- all 
for $10.26 
 
Ten years later, in 1898, available Kodak cameras included the Pocket Kodak and 
the Folding Pocket Kodak (figures 1 & 2). Both of these cameras were small, handheld 
cameras that could be loaded with film that would provide 12 exposures. While the 
Folding Pocket Kodak cost consumers ten dollars, the Pocket Kodak came with a smaller 
price tag of five dollars.27 No doubt, lower prices made these cameras even more 
accessible to consumers. 
The portability of these two products was emphasized in both advertising and available 
accessories. Kodak made several small carrying cases for their pocket cameras, with some of the 
cases being made specifically for mounting on a bicycle (figures 4 & 5). The ease and portability 
of photography had developed to a point where all necessary equipment could be brought with 
consumers, in a small case, and carried anywhere a bicycle could go.28 
 
26 Kodak.com. Kodak, www.kodak.com/cl/es/corp/aboutus/heritage/georgeeastman/ 
default.htm. Accessed 27 June 2019.  
27 1898 Kodaks. Rochester NY, Eastman Kodak Company, 1898, www.libraryweb.org/ 
~digitized/tradecats/kodak/Kodaks_and_Kodak_supplies_1898.pdf. Accessed 30 June 2019.  
28 Ibid 
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Both the Pocket Kodak and the Folding Pocket Kodak used Kodak’s cartridge loading 
film system. The system boasted ease of use and an ability to load film in broad daylight. 
According to Kodak’s 1898 catalogue section titled “Cartridge Photography”: 
The absolute simplicity of the system has been the secret of its success. Indeed, so 
easy has photography become under our system of cartridge cameras that any 
bright boy or girl of ten years can successfully accomplish every step of picture-
taking, from " pressing the button " to " doing the rest."29 
 
In 1900 the Eastman Kodak Company introduced the Brownie Camera. With a cost of 
only one dollar, it was the most affordable camera to date. Considering the price-point of the 
Brownie, along with the fact that less equipment and education were needed to operate the 
camera, the cost to own and operate the Brownie was much less prohibitive than other 
photography systems and set-ups. Kodak had, over a series of years and several different camera 
models, created the perfect scenario for taking photography to the masses.  
Photography of the late nineteenth century was already established, as mentioned before, 
as a serious profession and an art form. There was little demand by these groups for the new 
technology that Eastman had pursued. There were some attempts to spread photography beyond 
these established photography groups, but, as with the Warnerke roll film system that will be 
discussed later, none had been very successful. In addition, the quality of images produced by 
roll film was inferior to existing systems. This meant that roll film and the smaller camera it 
allowed for was originally rejected by the established photography community. As Kamal and 
Munir put it 
A major reason for its poor reception up to that time had been the extremely poor 
quality of the images it produced. While the camera did offer more mobility, this 
feature could not compensate for this drawback, which was exceedingly 
 
29 Ibid, 4 
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important to both professionals and serious amateurs, who constituted the great 
majority of the market for cameras30 
 
In addition, roll film produced inferior images to glass plates at the time.  Glass plates 
were much more stable, and resistant to bending, than plastic roll film was. This meant that 
photographers would get less distortion and a clearer image from glass plate photography than 
they would from roll film. 
At the same time, there were obvious drawbacks to the photographic glass plate methods 
and processes of the time. Eastman was not the first to attempt a roll film photography process. 
The roll film process that had received the most attention from the photographic journals before 
Eastman began development of his system was the Warnerke system. This system had at least 
five major criticisms brought by the photographic journals of the time. They included the 
assessments that the film was too expensive; that the mechanics of the rollers used to hold the 
film were awkward; that mechanisms for advancing and cutting the film would damage the film; 
that humidity had a negative impact in the structure of the film, causing warping of the film and 
images; and that the entire system was more expensive and less reliable than glass plate 
technology.31 
Just because serious professional photographers were not demanding lighter and more 
compact equipment, and less complicated processing systems, that does not mean that other 
consumers, potential casual photographers, would not appreciate these things. It was this vision, 
 
30 Ibid 
31 Reese V. Jenkins. “Technology and the Market: George Eastman and the Origins of Mass 
Amateur Photography.” Technology and Culture, vol. 16, no. 1, 1975, pp. 1–19. JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/3102363. 
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the belief that other consumers could exist for photographic products, that inspired George 
Eastman to pursue roll film and compact equipment.  
How, exactly, George Eastman and his Eastman Kodak Company addressed these 
problems, how they changed the idea of photography, and how they created a market for amateur 
snapshot photography is well documented. The strategies used to implement this shift are laid 
out in Nancy Martha West’s book Kodak and the Lens of Nostalgia. West touches on several 
themes that Kodak pushed through its advertisements between 1888 and 1932. 
As mentioned before, the Brownie Camera played a significant role in changing 
photography. It was not just a low price point that made it so important though. The portability 
of the camera allowed for consumers to take the Brownie with them wherever they went. Kodak 
used this in a thread of advertisements that encouraged consumers to bring their cameras with 
them on vacations. The idea was that vacationers should document their travels, forming 
narratives along the way. Kodak also implied that these memories could be kept forever, never 
forgotten, as they were physical proof to relive the experience through. 
Another way that Kodak shifted the idea of photography was to emphasize the fashion 
elements of their equipment. Kodak positioned cameras as a must have accessory, offering 
different colors in order to coordinate with the user’s outfits. Through marketing campaigns that 
emphasized photography as central to travel, fashion, and a lifestyle with enough free time to 
participate in these things, Kodak was able to shape consumer perceptions of photography. 
Snapshot photography would become something that was essential to a stylish middle-class 
experience. 
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Several advertisements were produced showing fashionable young women with their 
Kodak. These women in the advertisements were not necessarily using the cameras, but the 
implied message was that it would be fashionable to be seen with their Kodak camera. Through 
these advertisements Kodak was able to convey their message of the camera as a modern fashion 
accessory to people of lesser means as well. One did not have to be on an expensive vacation in 
the Catskills to use a Kodak camera, a trip to Coney Island would have been just as much of a 
reason to capture memories. In addition, although the consumer was to understand that the 
women in the advertisements were off on idyllic adventures, the images convey a message that 
even if one was not seen taking pictures of locations traveled to, being seen with a Kodak camera 
creates a perception that the owner is a person who could travel to these locations. 
The final step in changing the idea of photography was to confront and eliminate the aura 
of death associated with photography. Many families would display post-mortem photographs of 
deceased relatives. These pictures that were taken by professional photographers so that living 
family members could remember the deceased. Kodak aimed its advertisements at building 
happier, more playful narratives. Kodak was successful in eliminating the mournful aspects of 
post-mortem photography and replacing them with the idea that photographs should capture 
important, joyful moments that could be revisited and remembered fondly.32 
In several ways, George Eastman and the Eastman Kodak Company reshaped the way 
people thought about photography after 1888. Many of the ideas that were presented in Kodak 
advertising have lasted decades in the collective minds of consumers. Some of the ideas that 
 
32 Ibid, 136. West dedicates an entire chapter of her book to her explanation of how Kodak 
dismantled the aura of death that surrounded snapshot photography in the last half of the 
nineteenth century. 
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originated in the late nineteenth century still have a significant effect on how we think about 
photography in the early twenty-first century. These lasting ideas are proof of Eastman’s 
influence on the creation of a long-lasting consumer market. 
That consumer market that the Eastman Kodak Company was able to create, to satisfy a 
demand that was not there, was a market that Kodak dominated for decades. Kodak was not only 
able to change the idea of photography, but to change the idea in such a way that it was tailored 
to their own business model. Throughout the twentieth century Kodak made the majority of their 
profits by selling and processing roll film. The camera was a vehicle for their more important 
products and services. Getting an affordable and portable piece of equipment into the hands of a 
consumer would facilitate that consumer’s continued reliance on, and therefore purchase of, 
other Kodak products and services. This was the Kodak business model, and the market they 
created for their business model, that kept Kodak at the top of the photography world throughout 
the twentieth century. 
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Figure 1. Advertisement for the Kodak Pocket from the 1898 Kodak catalogue. Not only was the 
camera portable and easy to use, it could be fitted with a glass plate holder to facilitate glass 
plate photography as well.  
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Figure 2. Advertisement for the Folding Kodak Pocket from the 1898 Kodak catalogue. Note the 
emphasis on both technical and convenience aspects of the camera. 
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Figure 3. Advertisement for Pocket Kodak bicycle case from the 1898 Kodak catalogue. 
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Figure 4. Advertisement for Folding Pocket Kodak bicycle case from the 1898 Kodak catalogue. 
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Chapter 3: Digital and Decline 
Early Success in Digital 
   
In 1975 Kodak produced the first true digital imaging device, which could be called the 
first digital camera. This device was created by Steve Sasson, a Kodak engineer at the time. 
“Hardly anybody knew I was working on this, because it wasn’t that big of a project,” Mr. 
Sasson said: “It wasn’t secret. It was just a project to keep me from getting into trouble doing 
something else, I guess.”33 
Mr. Sasson’s small project eventually led to U.S. patent US 4131919 A. In the patent 
abstract the device is described as an, 
Electronic imaging apparatus, preferably an electronic still camera, employs an 
inexpensive information-recording medium such as audio-grade magnetic tape for 
"capturing" scene images. The camera includes a charge coupled device 
comprised of an array of photosensitive elements which form a charge pattern 
corresponding to an optical image projected onto the elements during an exposure 
interval. A charge transfer circuit converts the charge pattern into a high 
frequency pulsed electrical signal immediately following the exposure interval to 
remove the charge from the device in a short period of time to maintain unwanted 
"dark current" at a low level. Each pulse represents the image-forming light 
projected onto a particular photosensitive element. A high-speed analog-to-digital 
converter converts these pulses to multi-bit digital words in real time. A digital 
buffer memory temporarily stores these words, then retransmits them at a rate that 
is compatible for recording on the audio-grade tape. The image can be displayed 
on a conventional television receiver by reading the recorded words from the tape 
and converting them to a format compatible with the signal-receiving circuitry of 
the television.34 
 
33 James Estrin. "Kodak's First Digital Moment." Lens: Photography, Video, and Video 
Journalism, New York Times, 12 Aug. 2015, lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/12/kodaks-first-
digital-moment/?smid=pl-share. Accessed 6 Mar. 2018. 
34 Gareth A Lloyd, and Steven J. Sasson. Electronic Still Camera. US Patent US4131919A, 20 
May 1977. Google Patents, patents.google.com/patent/US4131919. Accessed 6 Mar. 2018.  
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Sasson’s creation was far from what we would recognize today as a digital camera. 
Modern digital cameras evolved from a machine that was heavy, slow, and required an array of 
additional equipment to have an image displayed. Sasson described the device as follows, 
It had a lens that we took from a used parts bin from the Super 8 movie camera 
production line downstairs from our little lab on the second floor in Bldg 4. On 
the side of our portable contraption, we shoehorned in a portable digital cassette 
instrumentation recorder. Add to that 16 nickel cadmium batteries, a highly 
temperamental new type of CCD imaging area array, an a/d converter 
implementation stolen from a digital voltmeter application, several dozen digital 
and analog circuits all wired together on approximately half a dozen circuit 
boards, and you have our interpretation of what a portable all electronic still 
camera might look like.35 
 
From his description of the device, it is not hard to imagine that the budget for such a 
project was underwhelming at best. With parts and pieces scavenged from old equipment, the 
only piece Sasson refers to as “new” is a CCD, or charge-coupled device, imaging sensor. 
Charge-coupled devices, the very first digital imaging sensors, were still a relatively new 
technology at the time. CCD had only been invented six years earlier, in 1969, by George Smith 
and Willard Boyle of Bell Labs. Early CCDs yielded low resolution still images, but were put to 
use in video cameras in 1970. The first major leap in imaging sensor resolution for still images 
came in 1980 when Japanese engineer Nobukazu Teranishi invented the pinned photodiode. It 
would be another 15 years after the pinned photodiode before NASA engineer Eric Fossom 
invented the complementary metal-oxide semiconductor, or CMOS, active pixel image sensor. 
 
35 Michael Zhang. "The World‘s First Digital Camera by Kodak and Steve Sasson." 
PetaPixel.com, 5 Aug. 2010, petapixel.com/2010/08/05/the-worlds-first-digital-camera-by-
kodak-and-steve-sasson/. Accessed 11 May 2018. 
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CMOS imaging sensors are the sensors used in most twenty first century smartphone and 
standalone cameras. The particular CCD in Sasson’s device was a Fairchild 100 x 100 CCD. 
This CCD produced a 100 x 100-pixel image. This was the equivalent of a 0.01-megapixel 
image.  
While it is a difficult comparison to make in terms of megapixels, the difference between 
digital and film photography image quality as expressed in megapixels can be staggering. 
Estimates of image quality of a photograph taken with film can range from 80 megapixels, using 
35mm film, up to, potentially, 400 megapixels with large format film coupled with professional 
cameras and equipment.36 This would mean that the first digital images that Mr. Sasson captured 
and displayed would have been vastly inferior to the average snapshot. An amateur photographer 
using their Kodak camera and Kodak 35mm film could produce a photographic image with an 
image quality that was approximately 8,000 times higher than the first digital images. 
As will be discussed later, Kodak’s identity was that of an imaging company. The 
company’s business model was based on processing and providing high quality images. This is 
part of the reason that Kodak executives did not immediately welcome digital imaging devices. 
The technology clearly needed to be advanced to a point where image quality approached a 
standard that the company had not just held itself to, but a standard on which Kodak based a 
 
36 Tim Parkin. "Comparing the Image Quality of Film and Digital." PetaPixel, 
petapixel.com/2014/12/18/comparing-image-quality-film-digital/.  
Ken Rockwell. "Film Resolution (Pixel Count)." KenRockwell, kenrockwell.com/tech/film-
resolution.htm.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
 
 
substantial amount of its identity. To bring this new technology to market too soon would have 
done considerable harm to the Kodak brand. 
In addition to a low image quality, the device weighed in at around 8 pounds. It was also 
comparable in size to a toaster and required 30 seconds to record the image to a storage device 
(Figure 5). Of course, convenience was not the aim of the project. Sasson had succeeded in his 
self-described busy work when he was able to compile an assortment of parts into a working, all 
electronic, imaging device. Efficiency could come later. 
The new digital imaging device was not the only piece of equipment that Sasson used to 
produce his images. The camera would record images to digital cassettes that were placed in a 
playback unit, consisting of a unit that would play the tapes and a computer, which was hooked 
up to a television (figure 6). Once the tape was inserted an image would appear on the television. 
Sasson described the process where he would “pop the cassette tape out, hand it to my assistant 
and he put it in our playback unit. About 30 seconds later, up popped the 100 pixels by 100 pixel 
black and white image.”37 
It is not hard to imagine why Kodak executives were less than enthusiastic when 
presented with the new digital imaging process. At the time, Kodak was the dominant company 
in global imaging and picture taking. The company was enjoying large profits on an array of 
products. Kodak had built a fantastic business model in which consumers could purchase a 
Kodak camera and film, take their pictures, and then have them developed with Kodak 
 
37 James Estrin. "Kodak's First Digital Moment." Lens: Photography, Video, and Video 
Journalism, New York Times, 12 Aug. 2015, lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/12/kodaks-first-
digital-moment/?smid=pl-share. Accessed 6 Mar. 2018. 
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chemicals and printed onto Kodak paper. Kodak’s business model was a near perfect example of 
vertical integration. 
 
 
Figure 5. Sasson holding the device that he is credited with inventing, Kodak’s original digital 
imaging device.38 
 
 
38 Stewart Wolpin. "20 Years Ago, Apple and Kodak Launched the Digital Camera Revolution." 
Mashable, 24 June 2014, mashable.com/2014/06/21/digital-camera-20th-anniversary/. Accessed 
30 June 2019. 
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Figure 6. Additional equipment used to view images captured with Kodak’s original digital 
imaging device.39 
 
 
By his own admission, Steve Sasson knew his digital imaging device and system could 
not immediately compete with film photography. Sasson, using Moore’s Law to predict the 
advance of technology, estimated that digital imaging would not compete with film for another 
15 to 20 years. As Sasson saw it, “When you’re talking to a bunch of corporate guys about 18 to 
20 years in the future, when none of those guys will still be in the company, they don’t get too 
excited about it, but they allowed me to continue to work on digital cameras, image compression 
and memory cards.”40 Sasson’s prediction was accurate, and in 1993, 18 years later, Kodak 
offered its first consumer digital camera. 
 
39 Michael Zhang. "The World‘s First Digital Camera by Kodak and Steve Sasson." 
PetaPixel.com, 5 Aug. 2010, petapixel.com/2010/08/05/the-worlds-first-digital-camera-by-
kodak-and-steve-sasson/. Accessed 11 May 2018. 
40 James Estrin. "Kodak's First Digital Moment." Lens: Photography, Video, and Video 
Journalism, New York Times, 12 Aug. 2015, lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/12/kodaks-first-
digital-moment/?smid=pl-share. Accessed 6 Mar. 2018. 
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The Common Kodak Narrative 
The downfall of the Eastman Kodak Company has been documented in news articles, 
blog posts, and books. Very few of these are what we might consider to have academic rigor. 
These currently available offerings have set the general opinion of the decline of Kodak, and 
have, since then, done little more than echo the same sentiment over and over. 
The commonly accepted opinion on the subject is that Kodak did not want digital 
photography to cut into their profits on film and development, so they never pushed digital 
photography. According to the common literature, Kodak seems to have been a company run by 
aloof administrators, people unable to see the future of photography because of the profits they 
were enjoying from film sales. While this is an understandable narrative, there is more to the 
story. This one-dimensional explanation leaves some questions unanswered and lacks the 
nuances of a well-developed history. 
The fact that Kodak was one of the top sellers of digital cameras in the 1990s does not 
make much sense if they were content to ride the profits of film and film processing at the time. 
Kodak sales exceeded $10 billion in 1981, with film, and its profit margin of about 80%, leading 
the charge.41 Still, Kodak poured a large amount of resources into developing digital image 
storage solutions, as well. Kodak produced a number of digital photography products in the 
1990s and 2000s, ranging from digital cameras to storage and organization solutions. By 2005 
 
41 "What's Wrong with This Picture: Kodak's 30-year Slide into Bankruptcy."  
Knowledge@Wharton, 1 Feb. 2012, knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/whats-wrong-with-
this-picture-kodaks-30-year-slide-into-bankruptcy/.  
Accessed 12 July 2019. 
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Kodak ranked No.1 in the U.S. in digital camera sales.42 None of this seems agreeable with the 
common narrative of complacent executives getting fat off of film profits. 
Complacency is a word that one often hears when examining the Eastman Kodak 
Company’s decline. A number of sources explain that Kodak was resistant to change, satisfied 
with film profits, and locked into a rigid corporate structure. This is not false, or an 
overstatement. Still, for all of the articles that have been written on the subject and for the 
purposes of learning from Kodak’s mistakes, there are small pieces of analysis missing that can 
enhance our understanding of the situation. 
One available resource that outlines the commonly accepted narrative is John J. Larish’s 
Out of Focus: The Story of how Kodak Lost its Way. As a former employee, Larish provides his 
view of the decision-making process surrounding Kodak’s handling of digital photography. The 
book looks at several Kodak CEOs of the 1970s and 1980s and their handling of a number of 
products that Larish would seem to have handled differently, if he were in charge at the time. 
Larish’s connection to photography is wide-ranging. After returning from service in the 
Korean War, Larish entered the photography industry. Positions held by Larish before his 
employment with Kodak included working in a photofinishing lab and technical sales for Ansco, 
a small firm that Larish describes as “Kodak’s only real competitor in the United States at that 
time.”43 Eventually Larish would find employment with Kodak. His time with the company 
 
42 Steve Hamm and William C. Symonds. “Kodak: Mistakes Made on the Road to Innovation” 
Bloomberg, 17 Sept. 2007, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2007-09-14/kodak-
mistakes-made-on-the-road-to-innovationbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-
financial-advice. Accessed 5 Aug. 2018. 
43 John J Larish. Out of Focus: The Story of How Kodak Lost Its Direction. Place 
 of publication not identified, Createspace, 2012. 5 
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would see him travel the globe as a Kodak representative, conducting classes and trainings. 
Finally, Larish ended his career at Kodak in senior marketing intelligence. This allowed him to 
“bring the developments in electronics and other new technologies at the beginning of the 1980s 
to the attention of thousands of people within the Kodak family.”44 After retiring from Kodak, 
Larish has published numerous articles on digital photography along with one of the early books 
dedicated to digital photography, Understanding Electronic Photography. 
In Out of Focus, two main arguments form the foundation of Larish’s explanation of 
Kodak’s decline. First is the Kodak Company’s hesitation to invest in Digital photography. The 
second is Larish’s opinion that the culture of the Eastman Kodak Company produced sub-par 
leadership at the highest levels. 
       Larish places blame for Kodak’s decline squarely on the highest levels of 
management. In fact, the text is organized by giving each CEO of the past four decades a 
chapter, complete with a chapter title that neatly describes Larish’s issue with that CEO, such as 
chapter three: The 800 Pound Gorilla, and chapter seven: A Kodak Man from Inside. He also 
provides stories about his perceived failures with products that do not relate to digital 
photography by lamenting Kodak’s decision to abandon their pursuit of copy machine markets as 
well as a brief mention of the patent infringement lawsuit brought by Polaroid.45 These stories all 
serve to enhance the idea that Kodak CEOs were nearly incapable of recognizing new 
opportunities, or at least unwilling to seize on them because of their reliance on film profits. 
 
44 Ibid. 5 
45 Ibid. 34-35. 
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Larish eventually makes his way back to digital photography and offers his views on the 
matter. According to Larish, when digital photography did begin to take off, Kodak was hesitant 
to push into the new territory. This was then an opportunity for other imaging companies to gain 
a foothold in the business. Because of previously failed products and a business model centered 
on film photography, “Kodak’s sole line of defense was film.”46 
To further illustrate his frustrations with Kodak management, Larish offers anecdotes 
such as this description of Steve Sasson and the original digital imaging device, “He lugged that 
ugly gadget around Kodak and took pictures, but everywhere he went he was told, “Forget it, 
don’t bother us.”47 Larish also admonishes Kodak management for their reluctant acceptance of 
the fact that Kodak had produced the digital imaging device and their eventual grasp at credit for 
the accomplishment. Larish states: 
 
To give Kodak the credit for inventing the digital camera, two decades after the 
initial digital camera patent was filed; Sasson was paraded around the world as 
the inventor of the digital camera and was even honored at the White House with 
the National Medal of Technology and Innovation. All of this attention certainly 
did not make up for the neglect that had been given to Steve Sasson and digital 
photography by Kodak over the same quarter century.48 
 
While this book is useful as a demonstration of the Kodak decline narrative, it often 
borders on a book of Larish’s personal complaints. John J. Larish is a former employee of the 
Eastman Kodak Company. Although he does not give any employment dates or position titles in 
the text, one can gather that he was involved in Kodak’s digital products in and around the 
 
46 Ibid. 43 
47 Ibid. 28 
48 Ibid. 28 
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1970’s and 1980’s. After his employment with the company he continued to stay active in the 
digital photography world. 
 Larish’s research papers, used for this book, are also available. They are kept at the 
University of Rochester, the same institution that houses the Kodak archives. Larish’s offering 
includes everything from personal correspondences with Kodak CEOs, newspaper and magazine 
articles, employee interviews, and more. The material also covers a range of topics such as 
Larish’s own opinions, Kodak advertising and public relations, and internal company 
directives.49 Unfortunately, it seems that the main purpose of most personal correspondences that 
are preserved is to provide self-serving proof of Larish’s actions and warnings. 
In late 2011 and early 2012, a number of articles were released concerning Kodak’s 
impending bankruptcy. Newspapers and business magazines began analyzing how a company 
that was so dominant, so important in a particular field of business, could have come to that 
point. While some outlets did a better job than others in capturing the nuance of such a 
complicated set of events, one common thread runs through all of them, the idea that Kodak 
executives were complacent, stubborn, or just plain unwilling to move away from old technology 
to new technology is the dominant view expressed. 
One of the best examples available to sum up how most people view Kodak’s handling of 
digital photography, and their eventual decline, is offered by Steve Brachman when he wrote: 
Addicted to the profits generated by its 35mm film, Kodak would do nothing that 
it saw as endangering the success of this business. A lack of early investment in 
digital photography during the 1970s brought a double-whammy during the 1990s 
as the giant corporation was not only laid low by smaller firms like Sony and 
 
49 John Larish Papers. 1970-2012. University of Rochester Rush Rhees Library, Rochester N.Y. 
John Larish Papers, boxes 1-13 
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Canon but the entire film photography industry created by the company was 
finally relegated to second-class status behind digital by the 2000s.50 
 
 This quote offers up all of the standard arguments. First, that Kodak was reliant on film 
profits and would not move away from this business model. Second, by not immediately pushing 
digital imaging, Kodak did not move fast enough with its new technology. And lastly, that 
Kodak did too little, too late when digital imaging began to take hold of photography markets. 
 Again, complacency is a central factor in this common narrative. There were no lack of 
publications offering this opinion at the time. Forbes Magazine’s website offered this insight into 
Kodak’s missteps: 
 The organization overflowed with complacency. . . Kodak was failing to keep up 
even before the digital revolution when Fuji started doing a better job with the old 
technology, the roll-film business. With the complacency so rock-solid, and no 
one at the top even devoting their priorities toward turning that problem into a 
huge urgency around a huge opportunity, of course they went nowhere. Of course 
strategy sessions with the BIG CEO went nowhere. Of course all the people 
buried in the hierarchy who saw the oncoming problems and had ideas for 
solutions made no progress. Their bosses and peers ignored them.51 
 
After Kodak filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy protection in January, 2012, the Financial 
Times ran a two-part story about Kodak’s fall. While this is one of the better pieces that 
examined several aspects of Kodak’s decline, the common thread of complacency could still be 
found.   
In January, overburdened with the legacy costs of its industrial past, Kodak filed 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. The reaction of U.S. strategy expert Gary 
Hamel, who in 1992 praised Kodak for creating “stored energy” for the future, is 
 
50 Steve Brachman. "The rise and Fall of the Company that Invented Digital Cameras." 
Ipwatchdog.com, 1 Nov. 2014, www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/11/01/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-
company-that-invented-digital-cameras/id=51953/. Accessed 12 Jan. 2018.  
51 Kotter. "Barriers to Change: The Real Reason Behind the Kodak Downfall." Forbes, 2 May 
2012, www.forbes.com/sites/johnkotter/2012/05/02/barriers-to-change-the-real-reason-behind-
the-kodak-downfall/#206c145b69ef. 
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typical. Asked recently how he explained Kodak’s decline, he said: “It was denial. 
It was just denial.52 
 
 There has also been no lack of criticism for Kodak’s lack of enthusiasm for digital 
imaging, and their slow movement towards acceptance of the technology. Former employees, 
and even Steve Sasson himself, have put forth the charge that Kodak did not act soon enough. 
An article in the New York Times about Kodak’s development of digital imaging and production 
of the first digital camera, reported that “Kodak’s marketing department was not interested in it. 
Mr. Sasson was told they could sell the camera, but wouldn’t — because it would eat away at the 
company’s film sales.”53 Sasson himself is quoted in the article, saying: 
Every digital camera that was sold took away from a film camera and we knew 
how much money we made on film. That was the argument. Of course, the 
problem is pretty soon you won’t be able to sell film — and that was my 
position.54 
 
The third aspect of the common Kodak narrative may be the most accurate through. 
Kodak did attempt to mount a digital strategy, but it seems to have been too little, too late. One 
thing that is striking about this is the pace of change in the photography industry. The quickness 
with which digital imaging did, finally, take hold was what caught Kodak off guard. As the 
Washington Times reported “The transition to a world without film occurred at lightning speed, 
 
52 Andrew Hill. "Snapshot of a Humbled Giant." Financial Times, 3 Apr. 2012. Financial Times, 
www.ft.com/content/19a8e5fe-7989-11e1-b87e-00144feab49a.  
53 James Estrin. "Kodak's First Digital Moment." Lens: Photography, Video, and Video 
Journalism, New York Times, 12 Aug. 2015, lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/12/kodaks-first-
digital-moment/?smid=pl-share. Accessed 6 Mar. 2018. 
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and Kodak is still playing catch-up in securing a firm foothold in the amorphous realm of 
electronic media.”55 
 In addition, the Financial Times articles dealing with Kodak’s downfall, attempts to 
convey that Kodak had come around to the idea of transitioning to digital, but that the decision 
had come too late: 
Rick Braddock, a Kodak director since 1987, whose career spans Wall Street, 
online retailing and private equity, recalls that “the mindset of the company was 
ready for the challenge: it was ‘Batten down the hatches’. We sold the healthcare 
business and we started the process of developing a digital response. But the way 
the market shifted was dramatically faster than we had anticipated or than I’d ever 
seen”.56 
 
So, while the sentiment that Kodak did too little, too late is not inaccurate, it also does not 
express the entire situation that Kodak was in. In order to appreciate the full scope of Kodak’s 
decline, a slightly different approach must be taken. 
 
A New Analysis  
Kodak’s story of decline in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is especially 
interesting if looked at through the lens of advertising and construction of consumer markets. If 
we allow ourselves to view two versions of the same company, separated by several decades, we 
quickly find striking differences in how those two versions operated. Nowhere is this more 
 
55 Ben Dobbin. "In Kodak's Troubles, a Snapshot of an Icon's Fall." Washington Times, 5 Oct. 
2011, www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/oct/5/in-kodaks-troubles-a-snapshot-of-an-icons-
fall/. 
56 Andrew Hill. "Snapshot of a Humbled Giant." Financial Times, 3 Apr. 2012. Financial Times, 
www.ft.com/content/19a8e5fe-7989-11e1-b87e-00144feab49a.  
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apparent for the Eastman Kodak company than in their efforts to create snapshot photography, 
and then an apparent lack of effectiveness in creating a market for digital photography. 
We know that Kodak invented the first all-digital imaging device, but does that mean 
they invented digital photography? If we look at digital photography as a specific consumer 
market with set expectations and narratives, and products that fulfill those expectations and 
narratives, then the answer is no. What the Eastman Kodak company did so well in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, creating a market for amateur snapshot photography, 
they failed to do for digital photography. In failing to create, or set, the market for digital 
photography, Kodak allowed the digital photography market to develop into something that they 
were not set up to compete with. 
To characterize Kodak’s decisions as a series of choices that amount to the company 
being in denial and ignoring looming realities is misleading. If we apply well-established history 
and business theory to the subject, Kodak’s decline can be seen as an eventuality for a number of 
reasons other than complacency and an unwillingness to heed the advice of people outside of the 
executive ranks. On the surface, complacency may seem like an obvious explanation, but it may 
be more significant to examine the very way Kodak did business, the identity it had created for 
itself, and the way it perceived itself. These factors, more that any ill-fated action or inaction, 
determined the future failures of the company. 
Because Kodak’s business model was based on developing images, digital imaging was 
obviously a disruptive technology for Kodak. Producing a digital image required no chemicals or 
papers. It required no professional processing procedures. All that was required was a digital 
imaging device and a display to view the images. This digital imaging process was as different 
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from Kodak’s established model as possible. The process, or lack of process, completely cut out 
everything that Kodak made their profits from. 
The focus of digital imaging would become the camera itself, not the process of 
developing the image. For the better part of a century, the actual camera used to take a picture 
was an afterthought in Kodak’s business plan. It was a device used to sell film and to encourage 
consumers to use Kodak processing to get the best imaging results. In fact, a picture taker did not 
even have to own or use a Kodak camera to use Kodak films, papers, and processing. Kodak 
would still make a significant amount of money if their film was loaded into a competitor’s 
camera. 
It is this business model that created problems for Kodak once digital imaging took hold. 
Kodak was not equipped to handle the shift away from a way of imaging that placed little 
emphasis on the camera itself to a way of imaging that was almost entirely based on the camera 
itself. Kodak’s expertise was in chemicals and chemical processes. The company’s patents were 
littered with chemical technologies. This was the imaging process that Kodak was set up to 
dominate. This was the imaging process that George Eastman masterfully created in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
This was also the imaging process that Kodak had good reason to be protective of. Kodak 
had begun to experience stiff competition from rival film and imaging companies, especially 
Japanese companies. While they still controlled a majority share of the film and film processing 
market, their market share was dropping and rivals such as Fuji Film were applying pressure 
from abroad. Reporting for the Washington Times, Ben Dobbin wrote: 
Entering the 1980s, Kodak still cornered nearly two-thirds of color-film sales 
worldwide. But excessive caution in exploiting new markets, such as point-and-
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shoot 35mm and single-use cameras, was taking its toll. The innovative Japanese 
were plundering Kodak’s fat profit margins. Fuji jumped from obscurity to within 
a whisker of edging out $16 billion Kodak as No. 1.57 
 
But foreign companies were not the only companies pressuring Kodak. As Andrew Hill 
pointed out in his Financial Times article: 
Bob LaPerle, who worked on the Kodak.com site from 2000 to 2005, claims 
clients such as U.S. pharmacy chains threatened to drop Kodak products in favour 
of archrival Fujifilm, if the group marketed its online gallery aggressively. “They 
were quite specific,” he claims. “If [we] put the Kodak brand on [our] consumer 
website and it competed directly with [their] film and photofinishing 
business . . . they would shift to Fuji. They made that very clear.”58 
 
In the United States, pharmacy chains also pushed Kodak. Pharmacies were an important partner 
for Kodak, because these were the places that consumers bought film, had film developed, and 
had pictures printed. If pharmacies did not agree with Kodak’s direction, they could use their 
considerable leverage to persuade Kodak. 
So, Kodak did what it needed to do to satisfy partners and maintain their dominance in 
their market. At the same time, what made Kodak a dominant film imaging company was not 
going to be useful in becoming a dominant digital imaging company. For a company to be able 
to dominate digital imaging, it needed no understanding of chemicals and papers. For a company 
to be able to dominate digital imaging, it needed no understanding of developing processes. 
What did a company need to dominate digital imaging in those formative years, though? We 
could look back now and create a list of attributes that current companies who dominate digital 
 
57 Ben Dobbin. "In Kodak's Troubles, a Snapshot of an Icon's Fall." Washington Times, 5 Oct. 
2011, www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/oct/5/in-kodaks-troubles-a-snapshot-of-an-icons-
fall/.  
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photography had. That list could be applied to Kodak and we would see that they were in no 
position to have any lasting force in a digital photography world. 
At the same time, George Eastman started off in no position to dominate photography in 
the late eighteen-hundreds, but he ended up doing just that. He had created a disruptive 
photographic technology, but so did the Kodak of the late nineteen-hundreds. How was George 
Eastman able to succeed, but modern executives could not, given the similarities? This is the 
more interesting question. 
A deeper, more nuanced understanding of Kodak’s history can be gained by evaluating 
the effectiveness of its advertising campaigns. This is not an entirely new approach. Nancy 
Martha West did a fine job in examining George Eastman and Eastman Kodak’s early 
advertising campaigns. What she revealed is a company that created a market for itself. It was a 
case of consumers not knowing that they needed a product until advertising efforts showed them 
how much they needed it. What better way to establish a century of dominance in an industry 
than to tailor make that industry for the company? This was Eastman’s second stroke of genius. 
Unfortunately, this is exactly what Kodak did not do in the late twentieth century. 
Kodak did not do enough to define digital photography on Kodak’s terms. It did not do 
enough to define the market for digital photography, either. By not defining digital photography 
and its market, Kodak essentially allowed other companies to define the digital photography 
market. Once this happened, the market became something that Kodak was ill-equipped to 
handle. 
 The digital imaging market would quickly become part of the consumer electronics 
market. As Michael Zhang stated in a 2017 article for the website Petapixel  
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Things aren’t looking good for the standalone point-and-shoot camera. As 
smartphone cameras continue to improve, compact camera sales continue to 
nosedive. A new historical sales chart with 2016 figures shows just how quickly 
point-and-shoots are dying off.59 
 
Even stand-alone digital cameras did not enjoy an extended period of time as the camera 
of choice. Cameras embedded in smartphones quickly skyrocketed, leaving all other cameras 
behind. This dramatic chart in Zhang’s article demonstrated just how quickly and harshly the 
photography industry was changed by the combination of digital photography and consumer 
electronics (figure 7).  
 
59  Michael Zhang. "This Latest Camera Sales Chart Shows the Compact Camera near Death." 
PetaPixel, 3 Mar. 2017, petapixel.com/2017/03/03/latest-camera-sales-chart-reveals-death-
compact-camera/. Accessed 6 Mar. 2018.  
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Figure 7. Chart documenting the rise of digital photography (especially smartphone cameras) 
based on unit sales.60 
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It is unfair to say that Kodak ignored digital photography, but its advertising efforts were 
clearly much less effective than previous marketing campaigns. The established nature of the 
company meant there were structures in place that limited what and how Kodak could do with 
digital photography. The largest hurdle, the hurdle that Kodak could not clear, was their own 
self-image. 
The majority of Kodak’s digital photography development and marketing was directed in 
two places. First, Kodak directed much of their digital camera marketing and sales towards 
professional photographers. Second, once the market for digital photography began to develop, 
Kodak developed systems and processes that attempted to treat digital photography as if it were 
the same as roll film photography.  
 An example presenting both Kodak’s focus on professional photographers and a 
preference to market digital as a complement to film can be found in the company’s involvement 
in the Olympics. Kodak had a history of involvement in Olympic competitions. Kodak cameras 
have even been a part of the official U.S. Olympic uniform in 1972 and 1976. Through this 
partnership we can gain valuable insight as to how Kodak viewed itself and the role of digital 
imaging. 
 At the 1992 Olympic games, held in Barcelona, Spain, Kodak began offering digital 
imaging services to professional Olympic photographers. According to a press release there were 
12 digital imaging booths at the Barcelona games, most of them were unused. As a show of how 
rapidly digital imaging and photography took hold, the 1994 winter Olympics, held in 
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Lillehammer, Norway, had the same number of booths, yet there were lines of people at each 
booth.61 
 For the 1996 summer games in Atlanta, Georgia, U.S.A., Kodak announced it would 
provide 20 booths and 20-25 service people, dedicated to these digital booths. While Kodak 
would provide digital cameras that could be loaned out to photographers, and instruction on the 
use of the digital cameras, each booth consisted mostly of equipment that would ultimately be 
used to digitize images captured on film. The two major pieces of digital equipment that formed 
a digital booth were Kodak RFS 2035 plus film scanners and Kodak XLS continuous-tone 
printers.62 
 Although Kodak announced that there would be three-times more digital equipment at 
the Atlanta games than there were at the Barcelona games, most of this equipment was focused 
on professional use. Kodak, in its press releases, touted its digital imaging for things like medical 
imaging that would be used in Atlanta area hospitals during the games. In addition, digitally 
produced Olympic Identification cards and security badges were boasted about.63 
 The digital equipment that Kodak made available for the general public to come in 
contact with was made to seem as if it were the digital complement to traditional photography. 
Some digital cameras and editing software were made available to the public. As Kodak saw it 
though, these would allow spectators to digitally produce a keepsake of their Olympic 
 
61 Kodak Imaging Center: A Haven of Technology for Olympic Summer Games Photographers. 
Aug. 1, 1995. University of Rochester Rush Rhees Library, Rochester N.Y. Kodak Historical 
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experience. By keepsake, they meant a photograph on Kodak paper, developed with Kodak 
chemicals.64 
 It would be easy to point to this as proof that Kodak was determined to subjugate digital 
imaging to film and the old business models that had allowed Kodak to rise to its position. This 
could, and usually is, seen as folly, especially in the early and mid-1990s, when digital 
photography was beginning to take off. If we look at some of the other factors that Kodak would 
have seen at the time, it may be understandable why Kodak was still riding film sales. 
 The most glaring counterpoint to the argument that Kodak clung to film beyond a 
reasonable point is that film was actually still in demand trough the 1980s and into the 1990s. 
We can again look at Kodak’s involvement in the Olympic games to find evidence of this. 
Kodak saw a dramatic increase in film use at the Olympic games throughout this time. 
 The 1980 Winter Olympics, held in Lake Placid, saw Kodak develop 15,000 rolls of film. 
In impressive number, to be sure, but that number rose drastically for subsequent Olympic 
games.65 In 1992, Kodak processed 130,000 rolls of film at their booths in Barcelona. That 
number rose again in 1994, when Kodak processed 135,000 rolls of film in Lillehammer. The 
estimates for 1996 were put at 175,000 rolls of film expected to be processed, and it is not hard 
to see why the company would have such lofty expectations.66 
 
64 Kodak Digital Sciencetm Technology is Changing the Picture of the Olympic Games. Nov. 13, 
1995. University of Rochester Rush Rhees Library, Rochester N.Y. Kodak Historical Archive 
#003, box 111 folder 2. 
65 Kodak Has History of Olympic Involvement. July 19, 1983. University of Rochester Rush 
Rhees Library, Rochester N.Y. Kodak Historical Archive #003, box 111 folder 2. 
66 Kodak’s Imaging Technology – Bringing the Images of the Centennial Olympic Games to the 
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1980 was only a few short years after the first digital imaging device was produced 
though. So, it can easily be explained that digital photography had not yet begun to capture the 
market from film. What is not as easy to explain is the dramatic increase in film usage by 
professional photographers at the exact time that digital cameras were beginning to take over 
camera markets in the mid-1990s.  
Kodak was stuck. They had a still lucrative business model that was worth protecting, but 
at the same time, held patents for digital technology that was beginning to transform the 
photography market. Obviously, many people have written and reported about Kodak’s 
mishandling of this situation, but this has seemed to focus on reasons for how and why that do 
not include Kodak’s inability to shape a new consumer market for digital photography and also 
dismisses the fact that film still made money for the company. The piece of common narrative 
that is most accurate is that Kodak did too little too late when digital photography began to take 
off. Even on this point though, we must acknowledge the extremely rapid rate at which digital 
imaging became a consumer electronics market and that Kodak was an imaging company that 
was ill-equipped to compete in a consumer electronics market. 
Christian Sandstrom, in his article “You Press the Button. Kodak Used to Do the Rest” 
stated that: 
the industry landscape was completely different in the digital era. . . the industry 
was flooded by entrants with a background in consumer electronics, such as Casio, 
Samsung, and Hewlett-Packard, not to mention Japanese camera manufacturers 
including Canon, Nikon, and Olympus. Large parts of Kodak’s competence base 
related to chemistry and film manufacturing were rendered obsolete. The vertical 
integration that had previously been a core asset to Kodak lost its value. Digital 
cameras became a commodity business with low margins. The problem facing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
 
 
Kodak wasn’t just that film profits had died but that those revenues could not be 
replaced.67 
 
It can be argued that, as much as any other reasons previously given, Kodak failed to 
capitalize on digital photography, because it did not set the market for digital photography, and 
that once the market was set for digital photography it was a market that Kodak could not 
compete in. This argument not only takes into account factors that run counter to the common 
narrative of Kodak’s decline, but it also raises another question. How could Kodak have possibly 
set the market for digital photography to a market that they could dominate, like they did for 
snapshot photography?  
  
 
67 Christian Sandstrom. "You Press the Button, Kodak Used to Do the Rest." MIT 
Technology Review, 9 Dec. 2011, www.technologyreview.com/s/426323/you-press-the-button-
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
To begin to answer the question of how could Kodak have created the market for digital 
photography, like they did for snapshot photography, we must look at the work of Clayton. M 
Christenson and Christian Sandstrom. Christenson’s The Innovator’s Dilemma used the example 
of the computer disc drive industry as his main example of how disruptive technologies can 
influence markets and affect businesses. Sandstrom’s work fits nicely with the subject of Kodak 
because of his focus on the imaging, camera, and photography industries. 
If we apply the work of Christensen to Kodak's development of a digital imaging device, 
we can see exactly what was to come. Unfortunately for Kodak, Christensen's work was 
published about two decades too late to be of any substantial assistance. What Kodak had with 
digital imaging was the definition of a disruptive technology. 
Digital imaging did not improve any of Kodak’s already established products. It was not 
a sustaining technology that could help film photography produce a better image at a lower price 
point. Digital imaging was a technology that was completely different than, and in direct 
opposition to, film photography. As with many other companies that have faced disruptive 
technologies before them and since, the Eastman Kodak Company had a difficult time dealing 
with this disruptive technology.  
How can companies effectively deal with disruptive technologies though? According to 
Christensen, a disruptive technology should be dealt with by a company whose size matches the 
size of the market for that particular disruptive technology. As disruptive technologies often start 
off as inferior products that have little appeal to established markets and consumers, they offer 
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no paths to substantial revenue. Because of this, large businesses, according to Christensen, will 
spend few resources on products that they see as unable to significantly boost profits. 
However, that does not mean that all disruptive technology gets forgotten. Clearly digital 
photography was not altogether abandoned. These technologies require smaller companies to 
take up their cause, improve them, and build their business in a manner proportional to the 
revenue that smaller markets can bring.  
Creating a smaller company, owned by, but independent of, Eastman Kodak, would have 
been one step the company could have taken to better position themselves in the digital 
photography industry. Kodak does have a history of spinning off companies and buying smaller 
firms. In 1993, Eastman Chemical was turned into a separate corporation after being part of 
Eastman Kodak since 1920.68 Another, similar, route would have been to purchase a smaller firm 
with digital imaging and consumer electronics expertise. In 1995 Kodak did purchase a small 
Israeli company, Algotec Systems, that specialized in digitizing, storing, and sharing medical 
images.69 Although the company did have some institutional knowledge of digital imaging 
services, their focus on professional medical imaging would have been of little use to Kodak in 
terms of mainstream consumer markets. 
 
68 “Kodak to Sell Off Eastman Chemical Co.: Restructuring: The spinoff, which will wipe out $2 
billion of debt, is in response to stockholder pressure.” 16 June 1993.  Los Angeles Times. 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-06-16-fi-3622-story.html. Accessed 5 Aug. 2019.  
69 “Kodak to Acquire Algotec, Bolster Medical Imaging.” 18 Nov. 2003. The Wallstreet Journal. 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB106917001744738500. Accessed 5 Aug. 2019. 
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 In doing so, Kodak could have continued to protect their film and developing model 
while simultaneously being in a position to reap the benefits of digital imaging. Although Kodak 
had separate divisions within the company who were responsible for advancing digital 
photography, Christensen would argue that this set-up would be insufficient. Management 
executives in large companies almost always divert resources from small projects with 
proportionally small profit potential. Only by having an independent organization, focused on the 
development of the disruptive technology would there be an opportunity for that disruptive 
technology to flourish and become increasingly profitable. 
This is a sentiment echoed by Sandstrom when he states “the market for digital 
photography was very small, almost insignificant for a multibillion-dollar company like 
Kodak.”70 Kodak could have created a small spin-off  company to handle digital photography, 
but even if they did they would have faced a substantial challenge from other companies that 
already had established expertise in consumer electronics. As Sandstrom reports, 
It was in fact Casio – a company with no past experience in the camera industry, 
that came up with the dominant design of a compact camera. In 1995, Casio 
launched the first camera with an LCD screen. This concept turned out to be very 
attractive since images could be viewed instantly. The big Japanese players now 
invested extensively in developing this concept. Having introduced both electronic 
calculators and digital watches in the past decades, Casio had developed a unique 
capability to rapidly wire integrated circuits and LCD screens into consumer 
products. The company could essentially use the same skills in order to enter the 
camera industry.71 
 
70 Christian Sandstrom. "You Press the Button, Kodak Used to Do the Rest." MIT Technology 
Review, 9 Dec. 2011, www.technologyreview.com/s/426323/you-press-the-button-kodak-used-
to-do-the-rest/. Accessed 9 Dec. 2011.  
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If digital imaging and photography are viewed as a shift brought on by disruptive 
technology, then the missed opportunity to dictate to consumers what this new, disruptive 
technology is, and why it is important to use, has to be seen as Kodak’s crucial misstep. If 
George Eastman’s ability to communicate to consumers the value of amateur photography, and 
the ease of use of his new products, can be credited as a major reason for Kodak’s dominance of 
the industry, then their inability to do the same for digital photography must be credited as a 
major reason for their downfall. Because Kodak did not do enough to create the market for 
digital photography, they had left the door open for others to define the market, and what digital 
photography would be. 
 While it is true that Kodak did not allocate enough resources to digital photography, it is 
not simply due to a lack of understanding or an unwillingness to listen to people who would 
eventually be proven right. Kodak followed a path that many responsible executives would have 
followed. They protected their largest markets and diverted resources from smaller markets that 
would provide less impact in their earnings. It is because of these reasonable decisions that Kodak 
failed, though. 
 Kodak’s actions highlight the importance of marketing and market creation when handling 
disruptive technology. Because Kodak was the architect of their demise, in many people’s eyes, 
the story becomes more interesting, but also more complicated. In the end, Kodak was not 
equipped to handle the technology they had initiated. This is not to say that the situation was out 
of their control or to excuse the decisions made, but once the digital photography market began to 
explode, Kodak was already too far behind to catch up. 
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